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Fading Away: Remembering to Forget What Theatre Was
John Freeman
This positional paper sets out to explore something of the ways in which 
memory is linked to cinema, in contradiction to theatrical performance, which, it will 
be suggested, is in danger of being arrested by its own past. In part, the following 
paragraphs create a peg on which to hang a series of often subjective notions 
of performance, ranging from installation through to body art. In so doing, the 
obsessive pre-occupation with the live body in late-twentieth-century performance 
emerges as the sole referent capable of being pinned down in an otherwise unstable 
and fragmented age of theatrical art and identity. Some well rehearsed links and 
ruptures between modernism and postmodernism are revisited. These are used to 
read the ways in which installation art betrayed the intentions of its own modernist 
makers, creating a postmodern site of subjective spectatorship.
This paper then is about the body, memory, and space. Those elements, which 
begin separately, will be brought together as the paper develops. Like many of 
this journal’s readers and contributors, this writer’s professional life is an often 
interchangeable blend of teaching, talking about, deconstructing, and creating 
performance. It is from the perspective created by the interface between the 
academic and the artist that this paper is written. 
Before things begin to deconstruct, we can start with some facts, with the 
faux emphasis of certainty. Cinema is named after the Greek word kinema; if the 
word denotes “motion,” we can say that the connotation is also with “emotion.” 
Theatre (like theory) has its etymology in theatron, meaning “where you view.” 
Theatre is thus about looking,1 whereas cinema is about movement and transport: 
the transporting to elsewhere via emotion. With ﬁlm we are carried away by 
emotion. Perhaps the closest word we can ﬁnd for this phenomenon is the Italian 
trasporto, which encompasses the attraction of humans to one another. It is about 
a going from and a coming to. This is the reason why love in the movies is about 
cinematic space and movement and emotion, both on the screen and in the viewer. 
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It is in this way that ﬁlm moves us as it moves. It is a geography of light and shade, 
of memory and hope, of community and loneliness.
The Latin root of the word “emotion” stems from emovere, an active verb 
composed of movere (“to move”) and e (“out”). It speaks of a moving force. Emotion 
then is about a moving out, the transferring from one place—or one state—to 
another. From what we see to what we feel. The word “feel” is possessed of currency 
that is both emotional and tactile. Feelings affect us physically. Emotion is of the 
heart and of the mind and of the body. Passive watching is as oxymoronic as passive 
loving. When we care about what we watch, we come to care all the more through 
the watching. We care about cinema because it transports us to someplace else: to 
a new world to view. The particles of light shone at 24 frames per second transform 
the ﬂatness of the screen into a type of fantasy-as-fact where stillness is always 
an impossible dream. By contrast, theatre—despite its own best efforts—serves 
too often to root us to the spot. This is as metaphorical as it is literal, through the 
cut and cost of our spectatorial dressing up as much as through the numbering and 
status loading of speciﬁc areas of seating. Theatre is the space where we view no 
more or less than it is the place where our standing within a social hierarchy is writ 
large and viewed. It was ever the case. The very anonymity of the cinema space 
allows us to see without being seen, nor to care less if we were . . . the fourth wall 
of the theatre serves as no more, ultimately, than a mirror that allows us to watch 
ourselves in the act of watching and of being watched. 
Guilio Camillo’s sixteenth century Memory Theatre, with its intention of 
presenting performatively that which would otherwise remain unseen, was a 
precursor to the ﬁlms of Wim Wenders as much as to the theatre work of the likes 
of Tadeusz Kantor. For it is cinema that most emphatically articulates our need to 
link the present with the past. If the connection here is obvious, inasmuch as the 
ﬁlm we view is always of the gone, the done, the dead, and the remembered, it 
is also more obliquely linked to the notion of the ways in which memory works. 
As the revolutionary Soviet ﬁlm director Dziga Vertov explained, cinema—like 
memory—frees us from the boundaries of time and space, enabling the co-ordination 
of any and all points of view to be posited in any way one chooses. Vertov’s take on 
ﬁlm was that it led towards the creation of a fresh perception . . . of the explanation 
in a new way of a world that would otherwise remain unseen and unknown. If the 
invention of the camera changed the way the world was viewed, it did so in ways 
that already existed in dreams and recall.
The acute sense of cultural displacement we currently feel is a central aspect 
of contemporary art and performance; and be it zenith or nadir this displacement 
ﬁnds its home in the marriage of ﬁlm and live theatre. As ﬁlm emerged historically 
from theatre, so theatre now aspires to ﬁlm. The employment of ﬁlm, video, and, 
more recently, computer technology in the work of the Wooster Group—not least 
their 2002 production To You, the Birdie—has its antecedents in Piscator’s 1927 
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production of Yvan Goll’s Methusalem, and in its own way extends the potential 
of live performance at the same time as it tampers, ground-shiftingly, with those 
Aristotelian ideas of unity that modernism, for all its innovation and inventiveness, 
seemed always to return to. Walter Benjamin understood ﬁlm as a medium more 
akin to surgery than alchemy, as something with the potential to reveal an optical 
unconscious. Benjamin’s views were posited between, on the one hand, a view 
of ﬁlm as being governed by psychoanalysis and, on the other, the more overtly 
political idea of ﬁlm revealing that which is otherwise concealed in the social order 
of things. In this way, ﬁlm occupies the space between Artaud’s faith in embodied 
actions working through sensation on the bodily perception of the spectator and 
Brecht’s famed use of montage as a strategy for revealing the inner workings of 
a given situation. When Brecht deployed montage in order to focus spectatorial 
attention upon the dialectical tension between the narrative thrust of a scene and its 
structure, his relationship to the cinema of Eisenstein was immediately apparent. 
Memory is the cartography of experience and the borders of memory are the 
edges of our screen’s ability to resurrect the past. In 1934 Benjamin wrote that he 
had for years considered the idea of setting out the sphere of his life graphically, 
on a map. Jorge Luis Borges once wrote a poem in which all of the journeys made 
during a person’s lifetime mapped the lines of his protagonist’s own face. As far 
back as 1654 Madeline de Scudery had published a ﬁctional map as part of her 
novel Clelie. She called this map a “Carte du pays de Tendre”: a topography of the 
land of tenderness. The emotional material of the novel was given a visual identity, 
inasmuch as the exterior landscape was used to depict the interior world of the 
characters. Like Camillo before her, de Scudery aimed to imbue the unseen and the 
emotional with legible form. Through the Lake of Indifference, the Dangerous Sea, 
and a town called Negligence, the visual—the optic—and the sensory—the haptic—
were brought together. It is hard to regard de Scudery’s work now as anything other 
than a paradigm for the ways in which art is approached and understood. 
As it is with our comprehension of the ﬁctional protagonist of Clelie, so it is 
that we make sense of the internal world of art through our visual comprehension 
of that which the artist chooses to make shown. The geography of art leads us 
to the core of our selves. But this is an awkward geography and an elusive self. 
When Alex Kelly, from the European performance collective Third Angel, writes 
that the company makes “work that strays into the grey area between the truth and 
ﬁction, memory and imagination . . . work that incorporates documentary detail and 
ﬁction but doesn’t bother to point out which is which,” she articulates the absence 
of ﬁxity in both the navigator and the route that turns the art of performance into 
an act of detection.2
Geography is the site where emotion meets memory. In the ﬁrst century A.D., 
Quintilian wrote of memories as architecture, with image-ﬁlled rooms of the mind 
triggering thoughts. In order to move our minds from room to room, these images 
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need to be affectively and emotionally charged. We need to care enough to take 
the time to make the trip. Like these invented rooms, actual spaces and places are 
loaded with the power to make us recollect. And as memory (like ﬁlm) is never still 
and never rests, so the remembered and the act of remembering, the trigger and the 
triggered, overlap and build and deepen. What we remember we change in the act 
of remembrance: the room of the imagination stays the same; it is we who visit who 
have always changed. And if these rooms have an optic quality, that quality is also 
always haptic. Haptic refers to being able to come into contact with, and, in this, it 
is art’s form, function, and reception no less than it is a function of memory.
Like the English Patient out of Michael Ondaatje and Anthony Minghella, we 
drift between memories and dreams as seamlessly as wrinkled sand dunes seen 
from the sky melt into love-crumpled sheets, as effortlessly as a mountain range 
becomes a lover’s back. Haptic articulates a sensory function: a function that is 
as much of the body as it is of the mind. Haptic also refers to kinesthesia, to the 
ability our bodies have to sense their own movement in space. When we live we 
move, and the less we move the more we want the eye to ﬂicker. Gallery-goers can 
gaze forever at the stillness of paint precisely because the movement they crave 
is in their own hands and in their own feet. In the gallery we stop, we shufﬂe, we 
step closer, and we then step back. Accordingly, ideas of elsewhere are always in 
our gift. We walk away and we return. “Elsewhere” in the theatre—that necessary 
need for visual movement—is the function of clumsy and outmoded metaphor. 
The limits of the stage become the limits of our seeing world. Sight lines hem us 
in, forcing our gaze down channels no wider than the wooden boards. If what we 
see is what we get then theatre rarely gives us as much as we need. 
As the chorus of Greek theatre has been replaced by the gossip-mongering 
of characters from small box soap-operas—where the venomous asides provide 
a running commentary on the action—so our narrative ﬁx is provided now by 
television and cinema. And it does so at the mainstream theatre’s expense. We 
no longer need the story lines of Chekhov played out a la Stanislavsky, anymore 
than we are drawn to the theatre as a space for education and enlightenment. 
More fundamental than this, however, is the possibility that in the memory game 
of art, theatre has been left behind. This is no mere wordplay. The grim legacy of 
postmodernism is that the only future we can look forward to is the past that has 
already been lived. As postmodernism grips us in its rigor mortis vice of selective 
eclecticism, the temptation to withdraw into modernism is strong.
Modernism carried with it—or was carried by—a claim that non-interpretative 
judgment could be applied to art—and that judgment could thus be universal. As 
interpretation is innately prejudicial, modernist art—and not least performance—
had at its core, the entirely honorable idea of emancipation; because understanding 
would not be reliant upon the privileging of certain interpretative methodologies 
over others, the work would be open and accessible to all. Or so at least went 
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the argument. More than this, the work would contain no vestige whatsoever of 
concealed dimensions, which could only be uncovered by speciﬁc interpretative 
processes. In this way, the work is what the work is. The art does not require 
differing forms of completion.
What we the spectators bring to art is a gaze that rests upon the perpetually 
present aspects of the work. Michael Fried referred to this as the “grace of 
presentness,”3 suggesting that the perceptual experience of the work is inseparable 
from the work itself. This idea was developed and subsequently challenged through 
ostensibly modernist installations, more than through theatrical and theatrically 
placed performances, and more so even than through painting. When Chris Burden, 
Vito Acconci, and Marina Abramovic created those installations such as Five-Day 
Locker Piece, Seedbed, and Night Crossing, which have since become iconic, the 
object/event was collapsed into the space in a way that was fundamental.4 The 
location became part of the event even when these locations were not ﬁxed.
Louise Bourgeois told us that: “The relation of one person to his surroundings 
is a continuing preoccupation. It can be casual or blunt. It can be painful or pleasant. 
Most of all it can be real or imaginary.”5 Whatever it is, it is increasingly clear 
that it cannot be ignored. With the gift of understanding via hindsight, we can 
see that this was one of the points on which modernism impaled itself. Art events 
could no longer be seen to transcend interpretation by virtue of the grace of their 
being or taking place when the very act of installation subverted and exposed the 
relationship between presence and spectatorship. In one fell swoop, certain key 
structures of receptivity were disrupted. As the space where the work was presented 
was central, so too was the internal and interpretative space the viewers carried with 
them. One could not be important without the other. This proved to be central to 
modernism’s falling away from favor, as the inclusion of the relationship between 
art and space—to the relations between art and its conditions of display—ran 
counter to the assumed authenticity of the work in and of itself. 
What is contained within the work is in this way no less relevant than it ever 
was—or than it was ever thought to be—but a shift took place that showed the 
perception of the artwork could not be accurately predetermined. Rather, it came 
into being through a combination of memory and anticipation, location, duration, 
activity, and experience. We could not then, as we cannot now, approach any work 
on its own terms precisely because our own terms work so emphatically as agents 
of determination. The only terms we can ever understand are our own.
Lyotard had it that “[t]he postmodern (art) denies itself the solace of good 
forms, the consensus of taste.”6 Likewise, Donald Judd wrote that art need not be 
demonstrative of “taste” so much as that it needed to be “interesting.”7 The interest 
that stems from surprise occurs when our autobiographical receptors are confronted 
with art events that resist or develop our expectations. Indeed, there can be no 
element of surprise without this trade off between anticipation and realization. When 
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modernists made their claims that art works could be perceived in ways that were at 
once authentic, immediate, and articulated via their own grace of presentness, they 
were in denial as to the presentness of s/he who observed. Art confronts and alters 
experience, to be sure, but the experience that is confronted can never be pure. The 
canvas may be blank, or as Peter Brook erroneously suggested, the performance 
space may be “empty,”8 but the spectator is always already ﬁlled with histories, 
estimations, preconceptions, and prejudices. We can see that, as modernism has 
given ground to the postmodern, so the art of installation has shifted from a focus 
on the object on display to an exploration of the elasticity of site. Where, after all, 
is the “object” in Stelarc’s keyboard generated spasticity that is Movatar?9 And 
where, come to that, is the site?
John Cage sought to dissolve a number of distinctions between music, sound, 
and silence. In part we can regard this as an invitation to listen without prejudice. 
And yet, without prejudice, we would not be able to hear, let alone listen. In fact 
the legacy of Cage is, like that of Cézanne, Cunningham, Beckett, and Picasso, that 
his work seduced us into looking above and beyond the borders of our expectations 
and assumptions. In so doing a number of the conventional divisions we impose 
on experience begin to fall away—and they’ve been falling ever since.
The gulf between modernism and postmodernism is not so wide as some 
imagine. Where modernism spoke of and for the universal, postmodernism’s 
engagement is with relativism. The gulf is not wide between them because each 
approach is of its time. As postmodern performance (whether it identiﬁes itself 
as such or not) is constituted out of a rejection of a number of universalizing 
worldviews, so too is contemporary life—no matter how nostalgic the aims of our 
age may appear. 
That there are no absolutes in our world is the sole absolute of twenty-ﬁrst- 
century life. Truth, authenticity, and beauty—the triangular frame that was used to 
encompass and identify much art of the past—are now all up for grabs, and they 
are just a little too slippery to hold. Baudrillard’s simulacrum is writ large in Jeff 
Koons’s million dollar copies of worthless originals, while “beauty” has emerged 
as an unstable and increasingly suspect category for the identiﬁcation and valuation 
of art. “Beautiful” might be used to describe a particular staging by Robert Wilson, 
or even of the way that Ron Athey’s punctured skin is bathed in light, but the term 
is unlikely to be possessed of such currency when applied to the work of Blast 
Theory, Orlan, or Fura del Baus. To search for beauty is, we often ﬁnd, to miss 
the point. We do well to remember, however, that there are distinctions between a 
concentration on beauty and a consideration of aesthetics. Wherever and whenever 
decisions are taken about the ways in which an artwork is presented, we witness 
an aesthetic articulation—albeit one that is used as a means to an end rather than 
as an end unto itself.
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Where modernist beauty has come to stand for a type of complacency—as 
an ultimately facile exercise—a postmodern sense of aesthetics remains central 
to the way we negotiate a response to art. One could argue that the more work 
moves from the excesses of theatricality towards the minimalism-as-naiveté of “is 
it performance or isn’t it?” the more important a sense of aesthetic arrangement 
becomes in distinguishing art and art making from general behavior.10 Art is always 
spectatorial (even when the only spectator is the artist in the act of making) because 
the activity of art making will always involve a consideration of aesthetics. Deciding 
not to care how something looks (quite apart from being an aesthetic decision in 
itself) is art’s falsest claim, and it goes hand-in-glove with the idea of “art for art’s 
sake” as some sort of cultural cancer: as a wholly negative act of self-contemplation 
and consumption. 
For the postmodernist no less than the modernist “art for art’s sake” is shorthand 
for the deterioration of art into meaninglessness. But the term also suggests that 
art has moved beyond the point of having to shroud itself in justiﬁcation. Art is 
independent and its values are not reliant upon the patronage of external scrutiny, 
even as artists seek endlessly to make themselves subject to it. Art for art’s sake is 
no more damning as a concept than pleasure for the sake of pleasure. Pleasure, like 
art, brings its own rewards and one person’s pleasure is another person’s pain.
If modernism in art stressed feeling over understanding perhaps all that has 
really changed through postmodernism is that we are more ready to accept that 
feeling is understanding. Liking the work is knowledge enough. Art can no longer 
make the demands it once did on the spectator’s attention. We have more to look at 
now. Accordingly we look at art if we so choose, and if and when we choose not, 
then we look away. In dropping its guise as an instrument of political change art has 
empowered us all. As Barba and Boal invite us to join in and become spectators, so 
too can we choose to walk away. Where Brecht showed us contradiction theatrically, 
Boal exposes us to it through theatre. In turning spectators into spectactors, Boal 
gives us the choice to stay or go, to play or to remain passive. The decision becomes 
ours, art is integrated into life and the illusionist praxis of traditional (modernist) 
theatre is further challenged.
The segue from modernism to postmodernism is contained in these attitudinal 
shifts, and they date back forty years. The blank and neutral objects created by artists 
such as Donald Judd and Robert Morris mirrored by the seen/unseen aspects of 
Acconci and Burden’s installations stimulated an awareness of the physical presence 
of the work and beyond this to a consideration of the art/spectator relationship in 
the real spaces of art and performance. Up against this type of concrete reality the 
artiﬁce of theatre as metaphor for “other” has never really recovered.
Artists make work in the here and now. Because of this all art is contemporary. 
The harder an artist seeks to recapture the past—whether through revival or 
imitation—the more powerfully the present pulls through. The interests of the 
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artist, or art maker, however, are rarely compatible with those of the academic. 
As art making is in the here and now, the analysis of art tends towards the there 
and then. The scholar seeks to locate art within a continuum, to make and show 
connections between what was and what is. Artists make art, academics pick art 
apart. Like the midwife and the coroner, we view the same phenomena from widely 
differing perspectives. No small surprise then that most discourses on art have less 
contact with the complexities of their subject than with the relative simplicities of 
well-rehearsed thesis and antithesis. Academic papers are interesting (on the few 
occasions when they are other than love letters to colleagues) primarily because 
they tell us something about how the particular academic wishes the subject to 
be seen. They (“we”/”I”) seek to deﬁne work through a type of literary depiction 
that glories most often in its own erudition. Fine and well, but when the role of 
academics is to prove themselves cleverer and more culturally vital than the artists 
whose work they explore art emerges as the casualty. If for no more reason than 
that a coroner is useless without a corpse.
We use Body Art as a term for work that locates the body as subject, object, 
focus, and site. The body has been utilized by a steadily growing number of 
signiﬁcant contemporary artists. We saw this development particularly in the 1960s 
and 70s, where the body was used as form and site of protest, and we see it now 
in the twenty-ﬁrst century, when the body is articulated as the battleground for 
extremity and a declared opposition to those ideological constraints imposed by 
the dominant culture. This is evidenced today in the work of Stelarc, Orlan, Tracey 
Emin, and Franko B, as it was thirty years ago by the likes of Carolee Schneemann, 
Chris Burden, and Vito Acconci. The body has not become outmoded or obsolete 
simply because it has been used by earlier generations of artists. Twenty-ﬁrst-
century practitioners come from different cultures, and they work in different ways 
to those who came before, just as visual artists, writers, and musicians are working 
differently to those who came before them. In this way the body can be regarded 
as the canvas on which ideas are given form and also as the form in itself. As the 
page, the ink, and the writer; as the instrument, the sound, and the musician.
On 31 December 1999—on his 49th birthday—Teching Hsieh concluded a 
thirteen-year performance that was never presented to the public. Like his April-
April One Year Performance of 1980-81, all that the art “contained” was the body 
of the artist. Our trust in the artist’s integrity is what separates art from artiﬁce: 
not a suspension of disbelief on our part so much as an act of belief. In body art 
the self is problematized. It is often doubled, idealized, made subject to acts of 
transgression and obsession, transformation and duration. The artists’ bodies are 
regarded as matter, as the raw material of their work. This raw matter is, in some 
way, transformed—made strange, as Brecht would have had it. The body strives 
for articulation through a type of exhibition . . . even when this is the exhibition 
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of absence. The body strives for difference, even when this distinction is made 
manifest via a re-framing of the humdrum and the everyday.
Art that has a focus on the body often runs counter to issues of morality. The 
British artist Damien Hirst has it that his work is neither moral nor immoral, so 
much as it is an invitation to the viewer to take a holiday from morality.11 In a similar 
way, we ﬁnd that emphasis is often placed on the ability or desire to transcend the 
values of current morality, whether this be through Orlan’s apparent disﬁgurement 
as a consequence of plastic surgery, Ron Athey’s blood-soaked and supposedly 
HIV infected cloths suspended above spectators, or Annie Sprinkle’s Public Cervix 
Announcement. This poses speciﬁc challenges to those of us who make art under 
the auspices of a university. Notwithstanding this, the ability to recognize that 
morality amounts to no more or less than a shared and subsequently imposed set 
of conventions is a key feature of much body art, and it is an area that is well nigh 
impossible to avoid. The question of who owns the body is no less pertinent today 
than it was in 1971 when Chris Burden made himself a target to be shot at.
Body art tends towards the presentational rather than the representational. 
In this, the artist is likely to function as both story and character—as subject and 
object. The artist positions herself as object since she is conscious of the processes 
in which she is involved. This is a tendency, not a rule. 
Nothing dates like the nearly new. In dealing with the contemporary, we 
need to be aware of what has gone before. In all but the rarest cases, body art 
(performance art/live art, call it what we will) is about investigation rather than 
homage. It looks to the present rather than the past. This is how art is most often 
made. As academics our art is unable to function within a denial of concept and 
context. We need to know the past in order not only to avoid it, but also to locate 
our own processes within an academically appropriate frame. It is not enough for 
us to say that the art can speak for itself. We have the obligation, at times, to speak 
for our art. Tutors cannot easily (or effectively) function as academic assessors 
of work if students do not present that work in ways that facilitate this academic 
response. And so, as students ask that tutors be more than receivers of their work, 
so tutors ask that students be more than its makers. We may be assessing the why of 
the work as much as the how, and this necessitates an understanding of the context 
within which the work has been made.
It may be that it is only through an acute consideration and concentration on 
self that we are able to understand others. Catharsis—inasmuch as we can ﬁnd a 
use for the term—exists as much within the domain of the artist as the spectator. 
When in the 1960s Bruce Naumann made sound and video recordings of his body, 
his work was part of an identiﬁable cultural shift that encompassed events, such as 
Tom Marioni’s The Act of Drinking Beer with Friends is the Highest Form of Art, 
alongside Chris Burden’s Five-Day Locker Piece, and Vito Acconci’s masturbation-
as-art that resulted in Seedbed. It was clear then, as now, that the self—one’s biology, 
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no less than one’s psychology—has currency as art. And this currency is the currency 
of truth. The body as real, the body as non-illusion, the body as evidence of its own 
being. If the psychological drama of Western tradition subjugates the body to the 
word and to the mind, making it abstract and discursive, postmodernism relocates 
the body as an ideogram that is embodied and innately performative. 
Truth in art has always had a doubled status. On the one hand, we crave the 
certainty that the signature and the artwork amount to a truth; on the other, we 
accept that art is (for the most part) no more than a representation of the external 
“truth” it depicts. And (for the most part) this seems reasonable enough. Clive Bell 
insisted that art should have nothing to do with life. His contemporary Edward 
Bullough wrote in 1912 that “[e]xplicit references to organic affections, to the 
material existence of the body, especially to sexual matters, lie normally below the 
Distance-limit, and can be touched on by Art only with special precautions.”12 At 
these statements a large part of Euro-American society breathed a sigh of collective 
relief that all was in order. Bell and Bullough’s views, however, were not shared by 
everyone. At the same time as they were making their claims for art’s lofty purpose 
Marinetti was publishing his Manifesto of Futurism, the Dadaists were waiting 
in the wings, and Duchamp was exhibiting his urinal as a Readymade. The First 
World War was about to turn the wrath of machinery on its inventors, and art was 
set to sacriﬁce its sense of certainty.
We live in an age where nothing is certain. And yet I feel certain of this: if 
theatre had not been invented we would not be inventing it now. Lost in a world of 
Reality Television and Quick-Fix Stardom, our collective memories have reinvented 
theatre as something other than it is. In this age of repackaged nostalgia nothing 
is more nostalgic than our willingness to sit silently in darkened auditoria whilst 
pretending to suspend a disbelief we long since learned to control. Rooted to the 
spot, we root ourselves too ﬁrmly in theatre’s golden past, remembering what we 
think we should and choosing to forget that theatre has become a medicine with 
all of the taste and none of the cure.
Seeing is believing, but that’s not the only order in which the words work. 
Possessing a priori belief in theatre only blinds us to the truth of our gaze. Blinds 
us to the fact that in all but the rarest of cases live theatre has been dead a long time. 
All that remains are the actors acting, the watchers watching, and the spotlights 
taking a century to fade away to black.
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